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1  | INTRODUC TION
In order to be able to appraise the communicative value of 
words and to recognize their meaning, it is important to assume 
that others understand them in the context of their beliefs. 
Language is not the only means for information transmission, 
but it is a particularly efficient way to change the mental states 
of social partners. If human communication is fundamentally 
inferential in nature (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), communica-
tors should ordinarily rely on their Theory- of- Mind (ToM) in 
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Abstract
Infants employ sophisticated mechanisms to acquire their first language, including 
some that rely on taking the perspective of adults as speakers or listeners. When do 
infants first show awareness of what other people understand? We tested 
14- month- old infants in two experiments measuring event- related potentials. In 
Experiment 1, we established that infants produce the N400 effect, a brain signature 
of semantic violations, in a live object naming paradigm in the presence of an adult 
observer. In Experiment 2, we induced false beliefs about the labeled objects in the 
adult observer to test whether infants keep track of the other person’s comprehen-
sion. The results revealed that infants reacted to the semantic incongruity heard by 
the other as if they encountered it themselves: they exhibited an N400- like response, 
even though labels were congruous from their perspective. This finding demon-
strates that infants track the linguistic understanding of social partners.
K E Y W O R D S
experimental pragmatics, false belief, language acquisition, N400, social cognition, Theory-of-
Mind
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monitoring and guiding their interlocutors’ comprehension of 
linguistic utterances.
Some evidence suggests that, when evaluating others’ interpre-
tation of utterances, people take into account the information avail-
able to their partners. Keeping the common ground of a conversation 
has been proposed to drive acknowledgements, turn taking, and 
continued attention (e.g., Clark & Brennan, 1991), while people also 
seem to be influenced by the visual perspective of a conversational 
partner in communicational situations (e.g., Keysar, Barr, Balin, & 
Brauner, 2000). Rueschemeyer, Gardner, and Stoner (2015) devised 
a “joint comprehension task”, during which they recorded the event- 
related potentials (ERPs) of participants, who read sentences with 
congruent or incongruent endings on a computer screen together 
with a confederate. The N400 ERP component is a well- established 
neurophysiological indicator of semantic comprehension, which 
is sensitive to semantic violations, such as incongruent ending 
of sentences (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). 
Intriguingly, Rueschemeyer et al. (2015) found that when adult par-
ticipants’—or even adolescents’ (Westley, Kohút, & Rueschemeyer, 
2017)—task was to monitor the comprehension of the confederate, 
they produced an increased N400 for sentence endings that were 
incongruent for the confederate only. Crucially, only the partici-
pant, but not the confederate, had access to additional contextual 
information played back on headphones. This finding indicates that 
judging others’ semantic evaluation of linguistic utterances relies on 
tracking and taking into account the interlocutors’ beliefs.
Infants seem to be particularly well equipped for learning about 
linguistic and nonverbal communication. Newborns are already 
sensitive to the abstract structure (Gervain, Macagno, Cogoi, Peña, 
& Mehler, 2008) and certain acoustic characteristics (Gervain & 
Mehler, 2010) of language. They exhibit specific sensitivity to osten-
sive signals (Csibra, 2010), such as eye gaze, infant- directed speech, 
or being addressed by their name, as measured by electroenceph-
alography	 (EEG)	 around	 5	months	 of	 age	 (Parise	 &	 Csibra,	 2013;	
Parise, Friederici, & Striano, 2010) and by functional near- infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) around 6 months of age (Grossmann, Parise, & 
Friederici,	2010;	Lloyd-	Fox,	Széplaki-	Köllőd,	Yin,	&	Csibra,	2015).	By	
6 months, infants expect speech to transmit information between 
agents even about invisible entities, such as intentions or preferences 
(Vouloumanos, Martin, & Onishi, 2014), and they already possess a 
small	 receptive	 vocabulary	 (Bergelson	&	Aslin,	 2017;	 Bergelson	&	
Swingley, 2012). Thus, the communicative value of speech seems to 
be evident for infants well before they produce their first words.
The capacity to represent others’ beliefs, which is crucial to be 
able to engage in inferential communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), 
seems to be present during the first year of life (Baillargeon, Scott, & 
He, 2010), perhaps as early as 6 or 7 months of age (Kovács, Téglás, 
& Endress, 2010; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014). Therefore, basic ele-
ments of ToM, in particular the ability to track others’ perspective 
and mental states, can contribute to language acquisition, especially 
to lexical development. Shortly after the first birthday, language 
comprehension seems to flourish indeed: word learning becomes 
more efficient and flexible (Werker, Cohen, Lloyd, Casasola, & Stager, 
1998), words map onto concepts (Yin & Csibra, 2015), and the vo-
cabulary	is	extended	to	abstract	words	(Bergelson	&	Swingley,	2013).	
The N400 can also be elicited around this age, but initially only under 
specific conditions. For example, high word producer 12- month- olds 
show it, but low word producers do not (Friedrich & Friederici, 2010). 
Infants as young as 9- month- olds exhibit an N400 if they hear objects 
named by their own mother, but not by an experimenter (Parise & 
Csibra, 2012), or if they are exposed to extensive familiarization with 
word–object pairings (Junge, Cutler, & Hagoort, 2012). By 14 months 
of age the N400 can be evoked reliably without these additional aids 
(Friedrich & Friederici, 2005, 2008), suggesting that semantic com-
prehension abilities become less dependent on situational aspects. 
Finally, at the same age, there is recognition of at least some sort of 
“common ground” (Moll, Richter, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) in 
social interactions. These developmental steps seem to be critical for 
effective inferential communication, allowing infants to start to take 
into account what others mean and understand.
The experiments reported here addressed the question whether 
14- month- old infants take the perspective of a communicative partner 
when they evaluate linguistic utterances, in particular, labels applied to 
familiar	objects.	As	infants	show	evidence	of	visual	perspective	taking	
from at least 8 months of age (Kampis, Parise, Csibra, & Kovács, 2015), 
track others’ beliefs about objects, and evaluate referential expres-
sions semantically, they should be able to judge how a communicative 
partner with a different perspective would interpret object labels.
2  | E XPERIMENT 1
This experiment aimed to establish whether infants would display 
an N400 effect in a live setting where another person is also pre-
sent. Previous studies with infants have shown semantic incongruity 
effects using video presentations, but never in live communica-
tive contexts. During a presentation of familiar objects in a puppet 
theater, we recorded the EEG of 14- month- old infants, while a hand 
pointed to and a voice named the objects in the presence of an adult 
Observer. We measured infants’ ERPs time- locked to the onset of 
the word label, which was either congruent or incongruent with the 
object for both parties.
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
• Fourteen-month-olds show an N400 effect even when 
only an observer encounters semantic incongruity (an 
object mislabeled), themselves not.
• Infants exhibit similar neural markers when following 
the linguistic understanding of a social partner as they 
show when processing word meaning.
• Results suggest that infant Theory-of-Mind goes beyond 
the attribution of false beliefs about object location as it 
allows attribution of miscomprehension as well.
     |  3 of 9FORGÁCS et al.
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants
Eighteen full- term, 14- month- old infants (mean age: 444 days; 
range: 428–457 days) participated in this experiment. They were 
all French monolinguals (hearing no more than 15% of any other 
languages according to parental report). The sample size—for both 
experiments—was determined based on previous studies of the 
authors and other researchers investigating infant N400 effects 
(Friedrich & Friederici, 2005, 2008, 2010; Junge et al., 2012; Parise 
&	Csibra,	2012).	An	additional	68	 infants	were	excluded	from	the	
final data analysis (21% inclusion rate). The main reason for exclu-
sion was not meeting the criteria of having at least 10 artifact- free 
trials per condition (Stahl, Parise, Hoehl, & Striano, 2010) (n	=	30),	
primarily because of eye movements (e.g., switching gaze from the 
Observer to the object or the other way around during the meas-
urement period), blinking, or body movements. Further reasons 
for exclusion were fussiness (n = 25), refusing the EEG cap (n	=	3),	
experimenter error (n = 2), or providing too noisy ERPs (n = 8).1 
Such an attrition rate is not unprecedented in the infant EEG lit-
erature (cf. Parise, Reid, Stets, & Striano, 2008). It can be attributed 
to natural infant behavior, such as visual exploration of the scene, 
and also to the length of the experiment: a single trial lasted about 
20–25 s because of the elaborate live experimental procedure, and 
together with the necessary short breaks, an infant needed to stay 
attentive	 for	 about	 25–35	min	 to	 produce	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	
artifact- free trials. We believe that participant exclusion was unbi-
ased with respect to any stable individual differences that would be 
relevant	to	the	capabilities	studied	here.	An	additional	four	infants	
were tested during the training of the assistants playing the role of 
the Observer; the first couple of experiments with each new as-
sistant were considered practice sessions, the data of which were 
not included.
2.1.2 | Materials
We used the audio recording of 15 object labels in French and selected 
corresponding real- world objects that we suspected that infants knew 
the labels for (e.g., bunny, cup, shoe, duck, etc.). These word–object 
pairs were adapted from Parise and Csibra (2012), and were confirmed 
via	 the	 French	 version	of	 the	CDI	 (Kern,	 2007).	Additionally,	we	 re-
corded seven short utterances to get infants’ attention, such as “Look!”, 
“How interesting!”, “Listen!” etc., in French, which were played back 
when	needed	(see	Sections	2.1.3	and	2.1.4	below).	A	female	speaker’s	
voice was recorded for all audio materials; she uttered the words and 
the sentences in a language- appropriate infant- directed intonation. 
(For further details see Materials—Data S1)
2.1.3 | Apparatus
Infants	sat	on	their	parent’s	lap	in	front	of	a	small	puppet	theater.	A	
research assistant, playing the role of the Observer, sat facing them 
on	 the	other	 side	of	 the	 theater	 stage,	 behind	a	30-	cm-	tall	mobile	
occluder halfway on the stage and a curtain that she could open and 
close.	A	 second	experimenter	 sat	on	 the	 left	 side	of	 the	 stage	be-
hind a curtain, hidden to the infant, manipulated the occluder, and 
placed and replaced objects according to instructions displayed on 
a screen not visible to the participants. We used E- prime 2.08 soft-
ware (Psychology Software Tools) to control sound playback and to 
provide EEG triggers at the onset of word labels. We also video re-
corded the infants using a camera to check during later analysis for 
eye blinks, head and body movements, and to monitor their attention 
trial by trial.
2.1.4 | Procedure
Before the experiment commenced, we explained the procedure 
to the parents and obtained their informed consent. Ethics ap-
proval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Université 
Paris Descartes. Parents were instructed to look downwards to 
the floor throughout the experiment and not to interact with or 
talk to their children, unless they felt it was necessary to soothe 
them.
In each trial (see Figure 1), the Observer first opened the cur-
tains	and	established	eye	contact	with	the	baby.	An	object	(e.g.,	an	
apple) was placed in front of the occluder, so that the baby could 
see it while it was hidden from the Observer. Then the occluder 
was lowered so that the object was revealed to the Observer. She 
attempted to make eye contact again with the infant by looking 
up from the object. This gaze alternation was repeated until the 
Observer was certain that the infant knew that she had seen the 
object. If the infant was not attentive or fixated the object with-
out looking at the Observer, she played back the pre- recorded 
attention getting utterances using a hidden button box and, if 
necessary, manipulated the object briefly. The occluder was then 
raised, and the Observer turned 90° to the left so that her eyes 
were behind the curtain on the side, and the object was replaced 
with another object (e.g., a car) by the second experimenter from 
behind the curtain. When the second object was in place, the 
Observer turned back, and the second object was revealed to the 
Observer by lowering the occluder. (We included this change- of- 
object procedure in order to match the stimuli closely to the one 
to be used in Experiment 2.) The Observer again made sure that 
the infant noticed that she attended to the object. The second 
experimenter then raised the occluder again, pointed at the ob-
ject from behind the curtain, and, using a hidden button box, the 
Observer played a recorded label that was, depending on the con-
dition, either congruent or incongruent with the object. We took 
care to present the audio stimulus only when the infant was en-
gaged. For 2 s following the playback, the Observer looked at the 
infant neutrally, while the pointing hand stood still, after which 
the	object	was	removed,	and	the	Observer	closed	the	curtain.	A	
2s break indicated the end of the trial. The next trial started by 
opening the curtain. The order of objects and labels across trials 
was determined by a pseudo- random sequence, in which the same 
4 of 9  |     FORGÁCS et al.
object did not appear more than once in three consecutive trials, 
and there were no more than two congruent or incongruent trials 
in	 a	 row.	A	 video	 recording	 of	 the	 procedure	 is	 provided	 in	 the	
Video S1.
2.1.5 | EEG recording and analysis
We recorded the EEG continuously via a 128- channel Geodesic 
Sensor Net at 500 Hz sampling rate. Raw data were filtered with 
a	 0.3	Hz	 high-	pass,	 and	 30	Hz	 low-	pass	 filter,	 and	 segmented	
into 1,200 ms epochs starting at 200 ms before the onset of 
the	 audio	 playback	 in	 each	 trial.	 Artifact	 detection	 algorithms	
(e.g., for blinks, eye movements, bad channels, etc.) were used 
to exclude bad segments automatically, and video recordings 
confirmed that the infants attended the scenes in the retained 
segments. Infants must have had at least 10 artifact- free seg-
ments per condition to be included in the final data analysis 
(Stahl et al., 2010). Bad channels were replaced by spherical 
spline interpolation, segments were averaged separately for the 
congruent and incongruent conditions, baseline- corrected to the 
200 ms preceding word onset, and re- referenced to the average 
reference. Raw EEG data are available upon request. When rel-
evant, Mauchly’s test was used to test for sphericity violations, 
and whenever necessary the Greenhouse- Geisser correction was 
applied. Statistical reports and effect size calculations follow the 
recommendations	of	Lakens	(2013).	(Further	details	are	reported	
in EEG Recordings—Data S1).
2.2 | Results
Based on previous findings (Friedrich & Friederici, 2005, 2008, 
2010), we identified a time window between 400 and 600 ms, 
and	13	parietal	electrodes	as	the	region	of	interest	(ROI)	for	con-
firmatory statistical analyses. To quantify N400 activation, we 
computed the average amplitude within this time window and 
ROI. We found that the N400 was more negative in the incongru-
ent (M	=	−13.8	μV, SD = 6.88) than in the congruent (M	=	−10	μV, 
SD = 6.86) condition, t(17)	=	−2.14,	 p	=	0.047,	 95%	 CI	 [−0.6	μV, 
−7.51	μV], Hedges’s gav	=	0.53	 (Figure	2).	 This	 confirmed	 that	 in-
fants detected when labels did not match the object on the scene. 
Grand- average topographical ERP plots for all electrode sites can 
be viewed in Figure S1.
2.3 | Discussion
Our results demonstrate that 14- month- olds display signatures 
of semantic comprehension in a live setting, when attending ob-
ject naming together with an adult. We found an N400 effect 
with a timing and distribution very similar to a typical infant 
N400.
3  | E XPERIMENT 2
This study addressed our main question: whether infants take into 
consideration others’ mental states to follow their linguistic com-
prehension. We investigated whether 14- month- olds track word- 
referent relations as understood by their communicative partners, 
F IGURE  1 Experimental procedure. These events were 
performed in a live setting while the Observer was interacting with 
infant participants
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and whether the underlying computations rely on the semantic con-
tent of object labels. We expected that an N400 effect would reflect 
infants’ evaluation of the semantic processing of object–label pairs 
from an observer’s point of view.
In this experiment, the object name uttered was always con-
gruent with the object from the perspective of the infant, but in 
half of the trials it was incongruent from the perspective of the 
Observer. We achieved this by inducing a false belief in the mind 
of the Observer about the identity of the object in the Observer- 
incongruent condition (Figure 1). The Observer- congruent condi-
tion was identical to the one of the first experiment, that is, the 
naming was congruent from both the Observer’s and the infant’s 
perspective.
3.1 | Method
The methods of Experiment 2 were closely matched to those of 
Experiment 1 with the following differences.
3.1.1 | Participants
Eighteen full- term, French monolingual 14- month- olds (mean age: 
443	days;	range:	425–456	days)	participated	in	the	experiment.	An	ad-
ditional	62	infants	were	excluded	from	the	final	data	analysis	(23%	inclu-
sion rate). The main reasons for exclusion were as follows: not meeting 
the criteria of having at least 10 clean trials per condition (n = 27), fussi-
ness (n = 17), refusing the EEG cap (n = 2), experimenter error (n = 4), 
F IGURE  2 The N400 effect in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The upper panels show grand- average waveforms over the parietal ROI. 
Negative is plotted up; time 0 is the onset of the audio playback. Green shadings indicate the time window of the infant N400 (400–600 ms). 
Topographical maps below show scalp distributions of ERP differences in the N400 time window. Colder colors indicate greater negativities. 
Red rings illustrate the ROI over which the N400 amplitude was quantified
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or providing too noisy individual grand averages (n = 12). Further eight 
infants participated in the training sessions of the assistants.
3.1.2 | Procedure
In this experiment, the label was always congruent with the object 
on the scene, and the two conditions diverged from the point when 
the Observer turned back following the object change. In Observer- 
congruent trials, the second object was revealed to the Observer 
by lowering the occluder, just as in Experiment 1. When the object 
was revealed to the Observer, both the participant and the Observer 
had a true belief about the identity of the object, and the label was 
congruent from both of their perspectives. In contrast, in Observer- 
incongruent trials, the occluder was not lowered after the Observer 
turned back following the object change. The second experimenter 
pointed at the object from behind the curtain, and the Observer 
played back the recorded label of the second object. When the ob-
ject was not revealed to the Observer, the naming was congruent 
with the object only for the infant but not for the Observer because 
she must have had no idea about the identity of the second object 
and falsely believed that the first object was labeled, from her per-
spective, incongruently.
3.2 | Results
The amplitude of the N400 was analyzed the same way as in 
Experiment 1. We found significantly greater negativity to the 
Observer- incongruent (M	=	−13	μV, SD = 7.51) as opposed to 
the Observer- congruent (M	=	−8.42	μV, SD = 6.84) condition, 
t(17)	=	−2.46,	 p	=	0.025,	 95%	 CI	 [−0.65	μV,	 −8.55	μV], Hedges’s 
gav = 0.61 (Figure 2), indicating that the infants detected the incon-
gruency for the Observer even if the labels they heard and the objects 
they saw were congruent with each other. To compare the findings 
of	the	two	experiments	we	entered	the	data	in	a	2	×	2	ANOVA	with	
Condition (congruent, incongruent) as within- subject factor and 
Experiment (1 & 2) as between- subject factor. The main effect of 
Condition was significant F(1,	34)	=	10.6,	p	=	0.003,	ηp
2 = 0.24, but 
neither the main effect of Experiment nor the interaction between 
Condition and Experiment was (all ps > 0.55).
Based on the visual inspection of the waveforms, we also identified 
a sustained frontal negativity starting from around 600–700 ms after 
stimulus	onset	(Figure	3).	We	ran	exploratory	statistical	analyses	over	a	
frontal	ROI	consisting	of	13	electrodes.	We	compared	the	mean	ampli-
tudes of 100 ms time windows between 600 and 1,000 ms after stim-
ulus	onset	for	the	two	conditions	in	a	2	×	4	ANOVA	with	Condition	and	
Time Window as within- subject factors. We found a significant main 
effect of Condition F(1, 17) = 9.75, p = 0.006, ηp
2	=	0.36	and	of	Time	
Window F(1, 51) = 15.5, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.48, and a significant inter-
action of the two F(2,	34)	=	7.34,	p = 0.002, ηp
2	=	0.3.	Planned	compar-
isons revealed no difference between 600 and 700 ms, t(17)	=	−1.89,	
p = 0.076, Hedges’s gav = 0.49, but significant differences between 700 
and 800 ms, t(17)	=	−2.71,	p = 0.015, Hedges’s gav = 0.71; 800–900 ms, 
t(17)	=	−3.52,	p	=	0.003,	95%	Hedges’s	gav = 1.02; and 900–1,000 ms, 
t(17)	=	−3.51,	p	=	0.003,	Hedges’s	gav	=	0.91	(Figure	3).	Grand-	average	
topographical ERP plots for all electrode sites can be found in Figure S2 
and further analyses in Results—Data S1.
3.3 | Discussion
Our results demonstrate that 14- month- olds spontaneously evaluate 
the verbal understanding of communicative partners. The difference 
found between Observer- congruent and Observer- incongruent con-
ditions indicates that infants track the mental states of social part-
ners, keep such attributed representations updated, and use them to 
assess others’ semantic processing of words in relation to referents. 
Intriguingly, the timing and distribution of the N400 effect were 
very similar to what we found in Experiment 1, although the infants 
themselves should not have experienced any semantic incongruities 
between labels and objects. Such an incongruity must have origi-
nated from the semantic evaluation of the label–object match from 
the Observer’s perspective, who must have believed that a different 
object was being labeled in Observer- incongruent trials. Thus, our 
study provides indirect evidence for attributing false beliefs to the 
Observer.
The frontal effect, which we did not predict but found in 
Experiment 2, is comparable to previous findings regarding ToM by 
Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, and Wellman (2009), although it is almost a sec-
ond earlier than for preschoolers and is in the time window of adult 
mentalizing processes (Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman, 2004; Liu 
et al., 2009). In contrast to typical false belief tasks, the potentially 
communicative nature of our design and specifically the live setting 
we adopted could have induced online monitoring of beliefs of real 
partners, which could underlie infants’ adult- like speed of mentaliza-
tion. Our results also speak to the debate whether there are two ToM 
systems: an ancient yet efficient one available first and a flexible one 
developing	later	(Low,	Apperly,	Butterfill,	&	Rakoczy,	2016);	or	a	single	
system, fully capable of attributing mental states early on (Baillargeon 
et al., 2010; Buttelmann, Suhrke, & Buttelmann, 2015; Kovács, 2016). 
Our finding, in particular the early frontal effect, suggests that similar 
systems could be at work in 14- month- olds as in adults. Moreover, im-
plicit false belief tasks are often portrayed as capable of demonstrating 
false belief attribution about location, but not about identity, and it has 
been argued that only the latter would be evidence for the attribution 
of truly representational mental states (Low et al., 2016). Our results 
indicate that 14- month- old infants can attribute false beliefs about 
something that is not identity but is not location either: the existence 
of an object belonging to a specific basic- level category at a certain 
location.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
The N400 ERP component is thought to reflect a violation of semantic 
expectancy (Brouwer, Fitz, & Hoeks, 2012; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that such an effect can be recorded from 
infants in a live setting when they match linguistic labels to objects. 
     |  7 of 9FORGÁCS et al.
However, we also found this effect in Experiment 2, where no seman-
tic violation was apparent from the perspective of the infants—as if 
the Observer’s knowledge state was a constitutive part of the seman-
tic context. Our finding therefore goes beyond the “social N400” ef-
fect reported by Rueschemeyer et al. (2015) and Westley et al. (2017): 
the explicit nature of their task could have invited top- down control 
mechanisms to monitor semantic information available to the partner. 
In contrast, our task was not only implicit, as it was not possible to give 
instructions to infants, but the information asymmetry arose from dif-
fering perspectives, not from differential availability of semantic infor-
mation. In other words, the infants did not need to assess the linguistic 
content of their social partner’s belief, nevertheless, they spontaneously 
did so. Given the relatively high attrition rate, further research may be 
needed to replicate these results.
One potential source of explanation of this finding is that infants 
might rely on the same neural and cognitive mechanisms to accom-
plish a task for themselves as they do for others when processing 
mental states (Kampis et al., 2015). Consequently, infants could be 
utilizing comprehension mechanisms devoted to detecting semantic 
incongruities when they are motivated to guess how another person 
could	have	understood	an	utterance.	A	further	potential	explanation	
of our finding is that the N400 effect reflects a violation relative 
to the general, shared semantic context, a sort of common ground 
(Moll et al., 2008), or cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995). Finally, it is also possible that, when they evaluate semantic 
relations, infants give priority to the communicators’ mental states 
(Southgate, 2014). The current experiment cannot sufficiently adju-
dicate among these accounts, but all these explanations share the 
F IGURE  3 Frontal ERP effects in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Upper panels show grand- average waveforms over the frontal ROI. 
Negative is plotted up; time 0 is the onset of the audio playback. Green shadings indicate where the frontal effect was significant (700–
1,000 ms). Topographical maps below show ERP differences in the 700–1,000 ms time window for the two experiments. Colder colors 
indicate greater negativities. Red rings show the ROI over which the frontal negativity was quantified
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requirement of tracking the semantic information available to com-
municative partners.
In sum, we found a neural marker of semantic incongruity detec-
tion in infants when their social partners, but not themselves heard 
objects labeled incorrectly. We also found a later frontal effect, simi-
larly to studies investigating ToM, with a timing comparable to that of 
adults. Taken together, infants appear to be not only well prepared to 
learn language and track the mental states of social partners but also to 
appreciate language at its full potential in terms of inferential commu-
nication: as a system where words refer to things, have culturally fixed 
senses, and enable us to change each other’s mental representations. 
Even before they start to speak, infants monitor the (mis)comprehen-
sion of communicative partners, raising the possibility that infants have 
a much more social take on language in general than previously thought.
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